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Firms often procure the same input via multiple means, e.g., making and buying.  Recent papers 
exploring such concurrent sourcing modes have yielded rich, but inconsistent, theoretical and empirical 
insights.  We suggest that resolving these inconsistencies and setting the foundation for future work 
requires reconceptualizing two aspects of concurrent sourcing: what and how. “What” refers to a 
surprising lack of clarity of what is meant by “same” inputs. We reconceptualize “same” as a spectrum 
of degrees of similarity and propose how similarity might be measured.  “How” refers to the 
governance modes combined in concurrent sourcing. Extending the literature’s predominant focus on 
make/buy, we reconceptualize concurrent sourcing as a set of combined governance modes—
make/buy, make/ally and buy/ally—distinguished from single modes of governance by certain shared 
characteristics, but differing from each other in their capabilities and limitations.  We demonstrate the 
potential of our reconceptualization with propositions predicting the use of concurrent sourcing and 
choice of specific concurrent sourcing modes as a function of similarity, technological volatility and 
performance ambiguity. Concurrently reconceptualizing “what” and “how” resolves strains between 
existing studies and strengthens the foundation for future work.  Furthermore, enhanced understanding 
of the trade-offs and synergies among governance modes generates theoretical, empirical and 
managerial insights relevant to governance choice situations beyond concurrent sourcing itself.   
 






What is the best governance mode (i.e., make, buy, or ally) to organize a particular transaction?  
Answering this question has a long tradition in management literature (e.g., Williamson, 1985; 1991; 
Oxley, 1997; Oxley, 1999; David and Han, 2004).  Typically, this question has been answered in 
either-or terms favoring one governance mode over another depending on the underlying transaction 
characteristics.  However, recent research on concurrent sourcing has begun to explore the possibility 
that firms combine generic governance modes to better respond to a rapidly changing environment and 
increasing knowledge and performance requirements (e.g., Parmigiani 2007; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 
2009). 
Concurrent sourcing is a governance form where multiple governance modes of market, 
hierarchy, and hybrids are combined in a systematic way.  Concurrent sourcing differs from hybrid 
governance forms such as alliances since it is not in between market and hierarchies, but rather is a 
combination of multiple governance forms in their full manifestation (Harrigan 1984, 1985; Bradach, 
1997; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Gulati and Puranam, 2006; Parmigiani, 2007).  While the concept has 
a long history, reaching back at least to Kessler and Stern (1959), it is a set of recent work (Gulati and 
Puranam, 2006; Heide, 2003; Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani and Mitchell 2009) that has finally created 
a critical mass of theoretical and empirical insights into the phenomenon. 
The recent growth of the literature has started to reveal strains across various theoretical 
conceptualizations of concurrent sourcing and the empirical results they yield.  We believe the time is 
ripe to revisit the body of highly insightful individual works in a more holistic sense, resolving some of 
the strains between them and laying a more theoretically consistent foundation for examining 
concurrent sourcing.  We begin by observing that there are two substantial areas in need of 
reconceptualization: what and how. 
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By “what”, we refer to a surprising lack of clarity regarding what actually represents concurrent 
sourcing.  Generically, concurrent sourcing refers to the simultaneous occurrence of multiple 
governance forms for the sourcing of the same inputs.  However, the boundaries of “same” are 
inconsistently defined across and even within papers.  Few would disagree that making and buying coal 
represents concurrent sourcing. Nor would many suggest that buying automotive tires and making car 
doors is an example of concurrent sourcing.  However, an empirically and theoretically relevant grey 
zone exists:  Does making 80 gigabyte hard-drives and buying 120 gigabyte hard-drives qualify as 
concurrent sourcing?  Would conducting exploratory research on mechanisms of cell growth via an 
alliance and conducting slightly less exploratory research internally qualify?  We will show how 
different conceptions of “same” have manifested in the literature, clouding theoretical progress and 
perhaps generating seemingly contradictory empirical results.  We then reconceptualize “same” as a 
spectrum of degrees of “similarity” and propose how similarity might be measured.  Reconceptualizing 
concurrent sourcing as the sourcing of more-or-less similar inputs via more than one governance mode 
helps resolve theoretical and empirical tensions in the existing literature and allows us to apply the 
theoretical insights generated in the concurrent sourcing literature to a broader set of circumstances. 
By “how”, we refer to the governance modes combined in concurrent sourcing.  The 
overwhelming majority of the literature has considered the combination of make and buy, sometimes 
termed “tapered integration” (e.g., Gulati and Puranam, 2006; Heide, 2003; Parmigiani, 2003, 2007).  
However, other combinations of governance modes, such as make-and-ally or buy-and-ally are equally 
valid theoretically and are frequently observed in practice (e.g., Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999).  
Therefore, we reconceptualize concurrent sourcing as a set of combined governance modes—
make/buy, make/ally and buy/ally—that are distinguished from single modes of governance by certain 
 3 
shared characteristics, but also differ from each other in their particular capabilities and limitations.1  
This reconceptualization provides a common framework for studies of different concurrent sourcing 
modes.  Additionally, it provides the foundation for more nuanced consideration of the relative benefits 
of each mode in specific circumstances. 
To begin our reconceptualization of concurrent sourcing, we will examine the limitations of both 
“what” and “how” in their current conceptualization.  We then introduce our proposed 
reconceptualization of each, discussing their theoretical motivation and practical application. We then 
demonstrate the potential of our reconceptualization by incorporating them into a set of propositions, 
which predict the use of concurrent sourcing and the choice of specific concurrent sourcing mode as a 
function of similarity and two dimensions of uncertainty: technological volatility and performance 
ambiguity.  These propositions are empirically useful and important.  More importantly, they illustrate 
how the enhanced understanding of the trade-offs and synergies among governance modes generated 
by reconceptualizing concurrent sourcing generates new theoretical insights (of uncertainty in our case) 
relevant to governance choice situations beyond concurrent sourcing itself.  Achieving that enhanced 
understanding requires concurrently reconceptualizing both “what” and “how”. 
CURRENT CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONCURRENT SOURCING 
Existing theoretical work largely maintains that concurrent sourcing can be explained by 
traditional concerns such as safeguarding and behavioral uncertainty (Dutta et al., 1995; Heide, 2003; 
McNaughton, 2002).  Empirical findings have been both intriguing and inconsistent. Dutta et al (1995) 
found a positive effect of asset specificity on concurrent use of house accounts and sales representatives 
in distribution, but no effect in procurement. Parmigiani (2003, 2007) and Heide (2003) conceptually 
identified performance ambiguity as driver of concurrent sourcing in different industrial procurement 
                                                
1 Trinary modes, e.g, make/buy/ally, have also been observed.  For simplicity, we constrain our theoretical 
development to the situation of two modes being combined. 
 4 
contexts.  However, while some papers have found empirical support for this relationship (Heide, 2003; 
Parmigiani, 2003), others have not (Parmigiani, 2007).  Furthermore, Parmigiani (2003, 2007) showed 
that technological uncertainty may lead not to hierarchical governance, as usually predicted, but to 
concurrent sourcing “indicating the benefit of learning from both internal and external suppliers.” 
(Parmigiani, 2003: 3).  
The “what” of concurrent sourcing: same versus similar inputs 
Concurrent sourcing refers to the simultaneous occurrence of multiple governance forms for the 
sourcing of similar inputs.  Most extant studies on concurrent sourcing conceptualize concurrent 
sourcing as making and buying the exact same input (e.g., Gulati and Puranam, 2006; Heide, 2003; 
Parmigiani, 2003, 2007).  For example, Gulati and Puranam (2006) state that “[F]irms often make and 
buy the same thing.” (Gulati and Puranam, 2006: 3).  Similarly, Parmigiani (2007: 285; emphasis in the 
original) specifically points out that “ ‘Concurrent sourcing’ emphasizes that firms are making and 
buying the same good, in contrast to considering a broader unit of analysis and/or one with more 
heterogeneity.” 
However, the “same input” may be difficult to delineate precisely from a “very similar input” 
because the identification of the salient feature based on which to determine similarity depends on the 
context in which the inputs are compared (Escobedo, Smith and Caudell, 1993; Tversky, 1977).  For 
example, Parmigiani (2003: 208; emphasis in the original) mixes similar and same inputs stating that 
“Importantly, more similar inputs tended to be concurrently sourced rather than bought.  This finding 
supports one of the key ideas presented throughout this dissertation that firms make and buy the same 
input.”  As Table 1 indicates, the blurring of “same” and “similar” appears common. 
-------------------------Insert Table 1 here------------------------- 
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Azoulay and Henderson (2001) study concurrent sourcing in drug development and find that 
“while a proportion of development activity is outsourced, there exists inside pharmaceutical firms a 
core of ‘insiders’ that are engaged in exactly the same activities as the CRO employees.”  However, 
this study also identifies relevant differences in the apparently “exact same” activities:  “We have 
shown in previous work that the allocation of projects to inside and outside teams present a very 
specific pattern: knowledge-intensive projects are more likely to be assigned to internal teams, while 
data-intensive projects are more likely to be outsourced.” (Azoulay and Henderson, 2001: 22; emphasis 
in the original).  
The identification and evaluation of relevant differences between seemingly “same” inputs is 
crucial both theoretically and empirically.  From a theoretical perspective, it is important to ensure that 
inputs that are sourced via concurrent sourcing are sufficiently similar to constitute concurrent sourcing.  
For example, making specific inputs in-house and sourcing generic inputs from external suppliers does 
not represent concurrent sourcing because the choice of different sourcing modes can be explained by 
relevant differences in the underlying transaction (Williamson, 1985).  To empirically control for this 
possibility a theoretical conceptualization of how to distinguish between same or similar inputs and less 
similar inputs is necessary.  
The difficulty and confusion in delineating “exactly the same” inputs from “very similar” inputs 
may imply that some papers that intend to study concurrent sourcing of same inputs are in fact studying 
concurrent sourcing of very similar inputs.  Hence, explicitly accounting for concurrent sourcing of 
inputs that are similar, but not exactly the same, may help clarifying extant inconsistencies in 
theoretical explanations and empirical findings in concurrent sourcing research such as the 
contradicting effects of performance ambiguity on concurrent sourcing (Heide, 2003; Parmigiani, 2003, 
2007).  For example, although focusing on “same” inputs, Parmigiani (2007) includes similarity as 
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control measure in her study and reports that input similarity is significantly negatively correlated with 
asset specificity, volume uncertainty and technological uncertainty, whereas it is significantly positively 
correlated with performance uncertainty.  The reported correlations in Parmigiani’s (2007) study may 
indicate that, for example, performance ambiguity is only a driver for concurrent sourcing if inputs are 
“more similar, [as] it should be less costly and easier for the buying firm to compare the offerings of 
internal versus external suppliers.” (Parmigiani, 2003: 201).   
While existing research has acknowledged the importance of similarity in explaining concurrent 
sourcing, two significant gaps remain in the treatment of similarity.  First, testable hypotheses about the 
effect of similarity on concurrent sourcing have not yet been developed.  Second, the measurement of 
similarity in extant concurrent sourcing studies is missing.  Our reconceptualization addresses both. 
The “how” of concurrent sourcing: Multiple combinations governance modes 
The overwhelming majority of the literature has focused on the combination of make and buy 
(e.g., Gulati and Puranam, 2006; Heide, 2003; Parmigiani, 2003, 2007).  However, other combinations 
of governance modes, such as make-and-ally or buy-and-ally are equally valid theoretically and are 
frequently observed in practice (e.g., Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999).  For example, Veugelers and 
Cassiman (1999) studied the organization of innovation activities and found that out of the 73% of the 
firms in their sample using concurrent sourcing, 12% were making-and-allying, 33% were making-
and-buying, and 55% were making-buying-and-allying.  Their results seem to support the absorptive 
capacity argument:  “[T]hose who are attempting to encourage cooperative research ventures in quickly 
advancing fields should recognize that the direct participation in the venture should represent only a 
portion of the resources that it will take to benefit from the venture.  Participating firms also must be 
prepared to invest internally in the absorptive capacity that will permit effective exploitation of the 
venture’s knowledge output.” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 149).  
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Including combinations of make or buy with collaborative governance modes completes the 
picture of the variety of concurrent sourcing modes.  Further, it allows us to bring to bear work that is 
not yet perceived of informing the concurrent sourcing literature.  
RECONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONCURRENT SOURCING 
Reconceptualizing “What”: Moving from “the same” to “degrees of similarity” 
As we demonstrated above, defining concurrent sourcing as the procure of the “same input” via 
multiple modes is problematic when “the same” has been used to describe both sets of inputs that truly 
are identical and sets of non-identical inputs that share many common attributes.  Therefore, we 
propose to reconceptualize the problematic term “same inputs” into degrees of “similarity”.  
“Similarity” can be conceptualized as a spectrum that is anchored at one end by identical inputs and 
extends towards infinity in the direction of dissimilarity.  At a minimum, inputs have to be destined for 
the same function in the downstream production process to be examples of considered concurrent 
sourcing (Parmigiani, 2003).  Beyond this, we use substitutability of production inputs as a heuristic to 
classify the degree of similarity (Parmigiani, 2003).  Substitutability describes the ease with which one 
input to production can be substituted for another one.  The better one input can be substituted for 
another input the more similar the inputs are.  
There are multiple dimensions along which two inputs could be more or less substitutable and 
hence, similar.  We expand on Parmigiani (2003) to suggest a partial list: 
(1) Overlap of the scientific/technological basis refers to possibility that two inputs can perform 
the same function in the production process but based on different principles.  For example, car engines 
can work with internal combustion, but also with the use of electricity or hydrogen.  The less similar 
the scientific principles underlying an input are, the more production routines are likely to differ and 
hence, the more difficult it will be to switch from using one input to using another one.  Also, the more 
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the underlying scientific principles differ the more the knowledge required to produce/use the input will 
differ. 
(2) Similarity of the production techniques and equipment refers to the possibility to utilize 
production investments that have already been made to use input A to use input B.  The more similar 
production techniques and equipment are the less likely are losses of economies of scale and scope.  
The more similar production techniques and equipment the quicker and less cost-intensive production 
facilities can be adjusted to use the different inputs.  
(3) Comparability of costs of using different inputs refers to the ability to substitute one input 
(e.g., sugar) for another (e.g., corn syrup) in the production process while still achieving a given output 
at a given cost.  The greater the cost differences, the less flexibility a firm has to switch from one input 
to another as the same output can only be produced with higher costs or the output has to be reduced 
when the cost are kept constant.   
(4) Comparability of consumer perception of a product made using different inputs refers to the 
possibility that consumers might not equally value a product that is manufactured using a different 
input.  Consider as an example the impact of replacing organic food ingredients with non-organic 
ingredients. 
(5) The quality of a product made with different inputs refers to potential differences in quality 
along dimensions not immediately available to consumers.  For example, two different types of fastener 
might influence the durability of furniture.  This difference may have long-term implications, e.g., 
increased warranty costs, even though customers will not be aware of the difference at the time of 
purchase. 
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In judging how similar two inputs are, different dimensions will be more important under 
different situations.2  For example, for a capital intensive product, dimensions 1 and 2 are probably 
most important, while for a product with high price sensitivity (e.g., soda) dimension 3 might be the 
most important.  For a luxury consumer good, dimensions 4 and 5 might be most important.  Thus, 
whether procuring two inputs via different modes represents concurrent sourcing depends on the 
context-specific managerial decision about which are the most relevant dimension(s) and how similar 
are two inputs along those dimensions (Tversky, 1977). 
We illustrate our logic using an exemplary input to car manufacturing, the engine.  Hyundai 
produces two versions of its Genesis sedan, one with a V6 engine, the other with a V8.  If Hyundai 
procured the V6 and the V8 via different modes, to what degree should we think of this as concurrent 
sourcing?  Clearly, they are not the same input.  However, if they were very similar, much of the logic 
of concurrent sourcing would be relevant and we could usefully consider it an example of concurrent 
sourcing.  How similar, then, are they?  In terms of the scientific principles on which they operate, they 
are very similar.  Both repeatedly introduce a gasoline-air vapor mixture to a chamber, cause the 
mixture to explode via an electrical spark, and capture the resulting energy to drive reciprocating 
pistons that connect to a rotating drive shaft and ultimately the tires.    
The production techniques and equipment used with both are similar.  Indeed, both the V6 and 
the V8 model are built on the same production line (Vasilash, 2008).  The cost Hyundai pays for the V8 
is likely to be higher.  The quality of the end product is unlikely to differ systematically with the engine 
and the average consumer’s perception of the V6 and V8 sedans are not radically different (see, e.g., 
Bell, 2009).  Overall, the V6 and V8 input represent very similar inputs for the Hyundai Genesis and 
could be thought of as potential concurrent sourcing. 
                                                
2 This list of dimensions is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, it lists dimensions that existing research suggests 
will be important in many cases. 
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It is worth noting that customer perception might differ dramatically depending on another 
context.  In a racing vehicle or a sports car, as opposed to a luxury sedan, substituting a V6 for a more 
powerful V8 engine would dramatically affect customer perception of the resulting vehicle.  Hence, 
although substitutable on all dimensions except consumer perception, engines may in fact not be 
substitutable based on non-substitutability on a single dimension.  This example illustrates that 
depending on the context two inputs may be considered similar in one context and dissimilar in another 
context.  
In contrast, compare a V8 internal combustion engine to an engine powered by a hydrogen fuel 
cell. The relevant scientific principles differ dramatically.  Rather than an explosion, fuel cells use a 
chemical reaction to generate electricity.  Production of a car using a fuel cell, rather than internal 
combustion, requires different tools and techniques to incorporate an electrically powered engine and to 
protect the fragile fuel cell from vibration and extremes of temperature.  Hydrogen fuel cells are much 
more expensive than internal combustion engines.  Also, consumer perceptions are likely to differ as 
hydrogen cars are more likely to be perceived as being “greener”, but also less convenient.  Quality 
differences of the end product are unknown at this stage.  So, while several automakers are purchasing 
fuel cells (primarily for experimental designs, rather than production), it does not seem reasonable to 
consider the procurement of V6 engines and hydrogen fuel cells via different means as concurrent 
sourcing. 
This reconceptualization addresses the difficulties we identified above.  At the most basic level, it 
is more linguistically precise.  Rather than describe non-identical inputs as the “same”, we can refer to 
inputs being more or less similar.  Additionally, it provides a more nuanced approach to defining 
concurrent sourcing.  Lastly, as we will develop in our propositions below, the degree of similarity 
serves as an explanatory variable in models of concurrent sourcing.  Our approach moves us from 
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debating about whether something is concurrent sourcing or not to a productive application of 
similarity as an explanatory variable. 
Reconceptualizing “How”: Multiple combinations within concurrent sourcing 
We believe that reconceptualizing the “how” of concurrent sourcing can help unify and extend 
existing studies.  In particular, attempts to relate causal mechanisms to the presence of “concurrent 
sourcing” are hampered by either (a) only considering one form of concurrent sourcing, typically 
make-and-buy, or (b) considering all forms of concurrent sourcing to be the same.  Researchers can 
address the former by expanding their definition of concurrent sourcing to include any combination of 
multiple governance modes.  While this may have implications for the design of survey instruments or 
gathering of secondary data, the change is straight-forward to implement. 
Addressing the latter point is more challenging.  We submit that, just as each single mode of 
governance has its own strengths and weaknesses, so does each concurrent sourcing mode.  This 
expands the question from whether concurrent sourcing occurs to which form of single or concurrent 
sourcing occurs.  
Understanding concurrent sourcing modes requires that we consider both the properties of each 
constituent governance mode in isolation and also their interaction.  Interaction between the constituent 
governance modes of a concurrent sourcing mode can take two forms.  First, two modes can be 
combined such that they augment each other’s strengths.  For example, learning from external suppliers 
can be more effective in the presence of absorptive capacity created by internal suppliers (Parmigiani, 
2003).  While R&D can be performed effectively by either governance mode alone, combining them 
increases the firm’s ability to learn and adapt to technological changes significantly (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990).  
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Alternatively, the modes may compensate for each other’s weaknesses.  For example, the 
diminished incentives of internal supply can be partially offset by combining it with external sourcing, 
which provides information needed to benchmark the performance of the internal supplier (e.g., Heide, 
2003; Parmigiani, 2003).    
APPLICATION OF THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF CONCURRENT 
SOURCING 
In this section, we put our reconceptualization of the “what” and “how” of concurrent sourcing 
into practice.  We develop a set of propositions that predict the use of concurrent sourcing and the 
choice of specific concurrent sourcing modes as a function of similarity and two dimensions of 
uncertainty: performance ambiguity and technological volatility.  Following much of the literature on 
concurrent sourcing, we remain within the transaction cost economics tradition.3  
Importantly, our aim is not to provide an exhaustive explanation of concurrent sourcing, but to 
demonstrate how one could apply our reconceptualization and the benefits of doing so.  Nevertheless, 
the propositions we develop are empirically useful and important.  More importantly, they illustrate 
how the enhanced understanding of the trade-offs and synergies among governance modes generated 
by reconceptualizing concurrent sourcing generates new theoretical insights (of uncertainty in our case) 
relevant to governance choice situations beyond concurrent sourcing itself. 
We begin by considering performance ambiguity.  After considering the governance challenges 
posed by performance ambiguity, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each singular governance 
mode as responses to those challenges.  By considering how these strengths and weaknesses interact, 
we develop our first proposition, predicting which mode from the full range of possible singular and 
concurrent sourcing modes is optimal in the presence of performance ambiguity (“how”).  Next, we 
                                                
3  We take a fairly expansive view of the boundaries of TCE, including extensions that consider the value of 
learning (see e.g., Argyres, Bercovitz and Mayer, 2007).  
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turn to the issue of similarity of inputs (“what”), positing that the benefits we have identified for 
concurrent sourcing in response to performance ambiguity are increasingly salient as inputs become 
more similar. 
After our discussion of performance ambiguity, we follow the same steps to develop two parallel 
propositions related to technological volatility.  Critically, our predictions regarding optimal 
governance mode and the role of input similarity differ from the predictions related to performance 
ambiguity.  These differences show the additional theoretical and empirical insights made possible by 
our concurrent reconceptualization of “what” and “how”.  Table 2 shows the characteristics of generic 
governance forms in responding to different types of uncertainty. 
-------------------------Insert Table 2 here------------------------- 
Performance ambiguity 
Performance ambiguity occurs when the causes of good or bad performance are not clearly 
identifiable due to the interplay of bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1975).  
Ambiguity increases the likelihood of opportunistic behavior since opportunism may go unnoticed 
when perceptions of behavior are ambiguous (Carson, Madhok and Wu, 2006; Ouchi, 1980).  Also, in 
situations of ambiguity cooperative acts may be incorrectly sanctioned as opportunistic, reducing 
incentives for cooperation (Carson et al., 2006).  To measure performance as the efficiency of input-
output ratios the firm needs to determine either production process input or output (or both) correctly.  
In reality, however, inputs such as the performance of workers or the effort of the supplier and outputs 
such as the quality or functionality of a good or service may be difficult to determine (Heide, 1994).  
This difficulty may be driven by difficulties in measurement (Barzel, 1982) or the non-separability of 
effort across actors (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
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Market exchange (buy) is difficult in the presence of performance ambiguity (Wathne and Heide, 
2000; Williamson, 1975).  Not only is it difficult to establish performance criteria initially, the buyer 
may be unable to determine when the supplier is acting opportunistically (Heide, 2003).  Furthermore, 
in the event of disagreement, third parties such as the courts will find it difficult to ascertain fault 
(Arrow, 1971; Masten, 1984).  While hierarchy (make) mitigates these difficulties, it is not a complete 
solution (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1985).  Williamson (1985) explicitly discusses 
shirking and inferior performance based on weak incentives within hierarchies.  Similarly, Ouchi 
(1980: 134) suggests that “Bureaucracies can fail when the ambiguity of performance evaluation 
becomes significantly greater than that which brings about market failure.”  
Hybrid governance (ally) also fails to address performance ambiguity.  Hybrids are based on 
social sanctioning mechanisms that are only effective when justified by a correct evaluation whether 
the transaction partner has behaved opportunistically or not, which cannot be accomplished under 
conditions of high performance ambiguity (Carson et al., 2006; Heide, 2003).  Masters et al. (2004) 
strengthen this argument and state that relational contracting actually increases the risk of opportunism 
because a firm creates a small numbers bargaining situation by developing closer ties to its exchange 
partners without the safety of complete integration.  Hence, in situations of ambiguity reliance on a 
single governance form as source of performance measurement may be insufficient as markets, 
hierarchies and hybrids suffer from substantial inefficiencies (Heide, 2003).   
In all three singular governance forms, these inefficiencies result from the difficulty of 
objectively measuring the input and/or the output of a production process.  Assessing performance by 
benchmarking one output with another one can help reducing performance ambiguity (Heide, 2003).4 
                                                
4 This parallels the concept of a promotion tournament from labor economics: the decision of which employee to 
promote is likely to depend more on the employee’s performance as compared to peers than based on objective 
performance measures when performance is difficult to measure (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 
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“In practice, measurement problems could exist that require different monitoring mechanisms to be 
employed simultaneously. […] If a meaningful standard for some reason is unavailable, output 
measurement may need to be supplemented with behavior controls and/or socialization processes.” 
(Heide, 1994: 77).  By combining two modes, each governance mode within concurrent sourcing 
counteracts the weaknesses of the other involved governance mode.  However, combinations of modes 
differ in their effectiveness. 
Reliably assessing performance of an input requires the firm to have knowledge about the input.5 
This favors inclusion of “make”, since internal organization usually generates understanding and 
knowledge about the characteristics of an input (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992).  However, as 
hierarchies suffer from weak incentives, monitoring compliance with performance objectives may be 
costly and inefficient.   
Markets are powerful in counteracting weak incentives, filling the incentive gap posed by 
“make”.  By combining making and buying, a firm increases incentives for both internal and external 
suppliers by maintaining a credible threat of switching to the better performing supplier when 
necessary.  Combining making and buying also decreases the risk of opportunism by filling the 
knowledge gap left by buying along (Dutta et al., 1995; Heide, 2003).  The detection of opportunistic 
behavior becomes more likely based on benchmarking the performance of internal and external supply 
together with internal understanding of the performance drivers.   
Concurrent sourcing modes that include hybrids fall short in addressing performance ambiguity, 
as hybrid governance fills neither the knowledge nor the incentive gaps left by buy and make 
respectively.  Hybrids cannot substitute for internal production in creating the knowledge needed for 
                                                
5 Heide (2003) shows that firms solve information asymmetry problems not by establishing multiple market 
relationships but by shifting from exclusive reliance on market transactions to concurrent sourcing.  Information 
asymmetry is closely related to performance ambiguity in its effect that it increases the risk of opportunism 
(Heide, 2003).     
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benchmarking.  Nor can hybrids substitute for market governance because contractual commitments 
and the need for renegotiations limit the firm’s flexibility to act upon poor performance outcomes.   
Hence, we derive the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Performance ambiguity is most strongly associated with make-and-buy. 
In situations of performance ambiguity the ability to benchmark performance increases with 
increasing similarity of inputs.  Performance ambiguity requires assessing performance based on the 
comparison of production process inputs and/or outputs that are coming from diverse sources of supply 
(Heide, 2003).  Comparing identical inputs provides the best grounds on which to identify differences 
between inputs and/or outputs of production.  Differences in output performance may be identified 
using, for example, relative performance tests in laboratories or in the field.  Internal understanding 
about the characteristics and production process of an input allows the firm to trace back the origin of 
potential performance differences and to evaluate whether performance differences are based on 
opportunism (Parmigiani, 2003).   
However, as inputs become less similar, it becomes more difficult to identify the source of 
performance differences because the inputs and/or outputs are not directly comparable.  Comparing less 
similar inputs to reduce ambiguity bears the risk of not identifying opportunism or incorrectly 
sanctioning non-opportunistic behavior. 
Hence, the ability of concurrent sourcing to reduce performance ambiguity increases with 
increasing similarity of inputs.  The following proposition summarizes the above reasoning: 




Technological volatility occurs when the future development of technologies cannot be assessed 
ex ante due to bounded rationality (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 2006; Walker and Weber, 1984; 
Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986).  In many markets, only a single or few technological standards 
survive. Firms that fail to ensure access to or compatibility with the dominant technological standard 
risk being locked out of the market (Schilling, 1998).  Hence, two related aspects are crucial in dealing 
with technological volatility (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Parmigiani, 2007): First, technological 
volatility requires the firm to constantly learn about diverse potential technological developments and 
trajectories to avoid obsolescence.  Second, technological volatility creates the need for flexibility to 
adapt to technological change once a dominant technological standard is (about to be) selected 
(Schilling, 1998).  We consider the need for learning first.   
The ability to learn about and evaluate potential future development requires the firm to have 
sufficient knowledge about the input.  Internal production provides the absorptive capacity required to 
enable the firm to absorb knowledge about technological developments (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999).  However, when only making an input, a 
firm’s learning potential is limited because weak incentives and inertia may constrain a firm’s ability to 
renew and augment existing technological know-how and the firm may not have access to diverse 
knowledge (Parmigiani, 2007; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl, 
2007; Sorensen and Stuart, 2000).  Market transactions are an inefficient means to transfer and 
integrate knowledge (Grant, 1996).  Even in combination with make, external procurement does not 
facilitate knowledge transfer as well as hybrid governance does because markets usually do not involve 
the same amount of coordination and cooperation (Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005; Gulati and 
Puranam, 2006).   
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Hybrids provide knowledge transfer enabling the firm to learn from partners through coordinated 
resource exchange and mutually beneficial interest alignment (Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 2000; 
Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996).  Coordination improves access to knowledge (Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000) whereas cooperation enables the mutually beneficial use of knowledge and resources 
(Hamel, 1991; Kale et al., 2000; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998; Powell et al., 1996).  “Learning 
alliances, in which the partners strive to learn or internalize critical information or capabilities from 
each other, constitute an important class of such alliances (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel, 1991; 
Khanna et al., 1998).” (Kale et al., 2000: 217).  However, when relying solely on hybrid governance, 
the firm’s learning is limited because the firm is lacking internal knowledge which serves as a basis for 
absorbing diverse knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996).  Hence, augmenting internal 
organization with hybrid governance (make-and-ally) improves the firm’s ability to learn about 
potential future technological developments (Parmigiani, 2007).   
The desire to maintain flexibility to adapt to technological change presents a different set of 
calculations.  Market exchange allows the firm to switch among suppliers, choosing whichever supplier 
currently provides the optimal technological solution (Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991).  Because 
the commitment to a given supplier is limited, changing suppliers faces few organizational barriers and 
incurs a minimal loss of investment (Williamson, 1991).  Hybrids are less flexible (Williamson, 1991).  
Although alliances allow the cost of investments in physical and intellectual capital to be shared, each 
participant still must make substantial investments that may be rendered obsolete by technological 
change.  Additionally, alliances require managerial attention and the development of relationship-
specific routines for coordination and governance.  Thus, alliances are difficult and costly to unwind 
rapidly in the face of change (Williamson, 1991).  Internal production is the least flexible of all options 
(Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986).  Not only does the firm bear the full cost of potentially 
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obsolescing investments, flexibility is reduced by bureaucratic adaptation procedures (Williamson, 
1985).   
Flexibility cannot be completely separated from learning.  Having access to at least some 
knowledge about technological developments is important to decide whether and when change may be 
required (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  Thus, despite the apparent advantages of the market, exclusive 
reliance on external suppliers may lead to dependency as the firm’s knowledge about technologies 
becomes outdated with technological volatility (Williamson, 1985).  Access to an alliance partner’s 
knowledge provides the firm with access to external knowledge without the costs and inflexibility of 
internal organization (King, Slotegraaf and Kesner, 2008).  Hence, augmenting external procurement 
with hybrid governance (buy-and-ally) improves the firm’s flexible adaptability to change.   
Thus, in situations of technological volatility, both the need for learning and a desire for 
flexibility favor concurrent sourcing modes that include hybrid governance (Dyer, 1996).  Whether it is 
combined with internal organization or market exchange depends on whether learning or flexibility is 
more important.  Make-and-ally is more appropriate to enable learning as it combines the absorptive 
capacity of internal organization with knowledge transfer advantages of hybrid governance.  Buy-and-
ally is more appropriate to support flexibility because external procurement preserves flexibility while 
hybrid governance provides knowledge to assess the need for change while limiting flexibility less than 
internal organization.   
We derive the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Technological volatility is most strongly associated with concurrent sourcing 
that includes hybrids. 
In contrast to performance ambiguity, concurrent sourcing becomes less useful as a means of 
addressing technological volatility as the inputs being sourced become more similar. Technological 
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volatility requires that firms learn about multiple competing technological trajectories.  Only by doing 
so the firm can monitor developments along each, compare their progress, and be prepared to pursue 
the trajectory that ultimately dominates (Schilling, 1998).  Concurrent sourcing of identical or very 
similar inputs via multiple modes provides learning about only a narrow range of technologies, as the 
knowledge associated with each overlaps to a large degree.  Decreasing similarity of inputs increases 
the potential for learning because firms can acquire knowledge about production processes that are 
sufficiently diverse to represent new knowledge (Dusseauge, Garrette and Mitchell, 2000; Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1998). 
In much the same manner, concurrent sourcing of identical or very similar inputs does not 
provide the firm with sufficient flexibility to adapt to technological change as developments that made 
one obsolete are likely to render the other obsolete as well.  Rather than hedging its bets, the firm would 
have increased its bet on a narrow subset of the technological outcomes.  In contrast, sourcing 
dissimilar inputs enables the firm to diversify the risk of obsolescence and to switch to the more 
technologically dominant source of supply (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; King et al., 2008).  
Hence, the ability of concurrent sourcing to reduce the risks of technological volatility decreases with 
increasing similarity of inputs. 
The following proposition summarizes the above reasoning: 
Proposition 4: Technological volatility is associated with concurrent sourcing of less similar 
inputs. 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we reconceptualize two aspects of concurrent sourcing to resolve some of the 
strains between existing concurrent sourcing studies and to lay a more theoretically consistent 
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foundation for examining concurrent sourcing.  Both reconceptualizations have important implications 
for theory, empirical research, and managerial practice.   
First, we reconceptualize the “what” of concurrent sourcing to clarify what actually represents 
concurrent sourcing.  We do so by conceptualizing concurrent sourcing as the sourcing of more-or-less 
similar inputs (instead of the “same” inputs) via more than one governance mode.  From a theory 
perspective, conceptualizing concurrent sourcing as sourcing of inputs with different degrees of 
similarity allows us to explain how different types of governance problems can be addressed more 
effectively by concurrent sourcing depending on the similarity of inputs involved.  By considering 
inputs with different degrees of similarity we highlight the different motivation and characteristics of 
concurrent sourcing in responding to uncertainty.  For example, whereas less similarity of inputs 
provides the firms with a greater learning potential and flexibility in situations of technological 
volatility, greater similarity of inputs supports a firm’s ability to benchmark performance in situations 
of performance ambiguity.  Considering inputs with different degrees of similarity specifically 
addresses the question of when a governance mode starts to qualify as concurrent sourcing and where it 
stops.  Broadening the scope of concurrent sourcing to situations of sourcing of similar inputs allows us 
to apply the theoretical insights generated by concurrent sourcing research to a broader set of 
circumstances.  While the question where this scope begins and ends has likely to be answered on a 
case-to-case basis, we provide empirically relevant dimensions of similarity of inputs to improve and 
develop measurement of concurrent sourcing.  As managerial implication we were able to predict the 
role of similarity in inducing concurrent sourcing. 
Our second reconceptualization refers to the “how” of concurrent sourcing and specifies the 
different possible and relevant governance mode combinations in concurrent sourcing.  Extending the 
literature that has predominantly considered the combination of make-and-buy, we include make-and-
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ally or buy-and-ally in our conceptualization.  Importantly, we do so not by merely widening the 
definition of concurrent sourcing, but by considering each combination’s unique characteristics.  This 
reconceptualization provides a common framework for studies of different concurrent sourcing modes.  
Additionally, it provides the foundation for a theoretically and empirically more nuanced consideration 
of the relative benefits of each mode in specific circumstances and connects to our first 
reconceptualization by specifying which governance mode combinations best allow addressing the 
different governance problems. 
We applied our concurrent reconceptualization to the situations of technological volatility and 
performance ambiguity as these generate distinct but relevant governance problems.  However, this is 
just one application and we believe the concurrent reconceptualization can be helpful in understanding 
the role of other drivers of concurrent sourcing, such as expertise and capabilities.  Parmigiani and 
Mitchell (2009) for instance, study how within-firm and inter-firm expertise is associated with 
concurrent sourcing.  They find that “firms often need to make in order to know, but can partially 
outsource if they possess sufficient expertise.” (Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009: 1065).  Our 
reconceptualization can add to understanding those relationships by examining how similar or different 
inputs and thus firm and supplier related expertise and capabilities need to be to best support 
knowledge creation or flexibility.  Also, using our reconceptualization, examining how different 
governance mode combinations support knowledge creation represents an interesting path for future 
research. 
In practical terms, integrating our reconceptualization into empirical research begins with “what”, 
that is, determining the dimensions of potential similarity that are most relevant to the empirical setting 
at hand.  The next step is to develop a measurement scale for how substitutable inputs are along the 
relevant dimensions, recognizing that the scale may vary across dimensions.  The last step is to develop 
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a weighting scheme among the dimensions, which may be driven by data, theory or a mixture of the 
two.  While we have offered recommendations on each step throughout the paper, industry expertise 
will be extremely valuable throughout the process. 
Expanding the full set of potential governance choices (“how”) begins with determining the 
governance challenges to be overcome.  The next step is to consider the degree to which each single 
governance mode addresses them.  If significant challenges are left unaddressed by any single 
governance mode, consideration turns to what combination of governance modes will more completely 
address governance challenges.  The optimal mode of concurrent sourcing may or may not include the 
optimal single governance mode. 
From a broader perspective, this paper contributes to a more detailed understanding of 
governance choice and governance combinations in general.  We highlight the different ways in which 
governance mode combinations work depending on the type of governance problem at hand:  
Performance ambiguity triggers an opportunism-based governance problem that can be addressed by 
inducing competition between governance modes (such as in make-and-buy).  Technological volatility, 
however, triggers a knowledge- and flexibility-based governance problem that can be addressed by 
inducing collaboration between governance modes within concurrent sourcing.  A more nuanced study 
of the way how governance modes may interact represents an interesting path for future research.  
Based on our reconceptualization, a more nuanced understanding of concurrent sourcing 
involving two governance modes lays the foundation for studying concurrent sourcing involving three 
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TABLE 1 Conceptions of sameness of concurrently sourced inputs 
 
Paper Type of input Conceptualization of the 
“sameness” of inputs 






“[T]here exists inside 
pharmaceutical firms a core of 
“insiders” that are engaged in 
exactly the same activities as 
the CRO employees.” (p. 22; 
emphasis in the original) 
Similar: “[K]nowledge-
intensive projects are more 
likely to be assigned to internal 
teams, while data-intensive 
projects are more likely to be 
outsourced.” (p. 22; emphasis 











“This article examines the 
phenomenon of plural 
governance, a firm’s 
simultaneous use of market 
contracting and vertical 
integration for the same basic 
transaction.” (p. 18) 
Same: Measurement of 
dependent variable: “What 
percentage, if any, of your 
needs for this component do 




5 inputs: Die design, 




“ ‘Concurrent sourcing’ 
emphasizes that firms are 
making and buying the same 
good, in contrast to 
considering a broader unit of 
analysis and/or one with more 
heterogeneity.” (285; 
emphasis in the original) 
Similar: Input similarity is 
measured as control variable. 
Results show that more similar 
inputs are rather concurrently 




Innovation activity “[…]the decision of the 
innovative firm to produce 
technology itself (Make) or to 
source technology externally 
(Buy) [...]” (p. 63) 
Similar: Inputs are 
complementary. “But there are 
ample arguments to stress the 
complementarity between in-
house R&D and external 
know-how [...]” (p. 64) 
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 Technological Volatility Performance Ambiguity 
Nature of Uncertainty Uncertainty about future 
technological change 
Uncertainty about current 
performance states 
Nature of Governance 
Problem 
Adaptation Performance Evaluation 
Market characteristics in 
responding to … 
- Weak knowledge transfer 
+ Strong adaptability and 
flexibility 
- Risk of opportunism 
+ Strong incentives 
Hybrid characteristics in 
responding to … 
+ Enabling knowledge 
transfer 
- Lack of absorptive capacity  
- Closer ties to exchange 
partners without safety of 
complete integration 
- Social sanctioning 
mechanisms ineffective in 
detecting opportunism 
Hierarchy characteristics 
in responding to… 
+ Absorptive capacity 
- Risk of obsolescence of 
investments 
- Risk of inertia 
+ Administrative support by 
bureaucracy 
- Weak incentives 
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